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MAKING GLOBAL FINANCIAL HISTORY 
The crisis of 2008 and the return of the past 
Amin Samman 





The past does not simply provide conditions of possibility for capitalist finance; it also serves 
as a vital resource for those who might seek to understand or negotiate it in a particular 
present. However, scholars of finance and crisis have overlooked this point at precisely the 
same time that they themselves have sought to find clues or lessons in financial history. This 
article provides a reading of how and why the past has come to acquire such a strange 
presence within contemporary capitalism. Following Michel de Certeau, it approaches 
historiography as an operation, focusing on how the past has figured within three distinct but 
related fields of social science – namely, financial economics, economic history, and 
constructivist political economy. It demonstrates how each of these fields has been structured 
around an exclusion of the recollected past as an input into historical process, and argues that 
this has been revealed by the discursive response to the crisis of 2008, which in turn should be 
understood as a breakdown in the machinery of capitalist historiography. It concludes by 
suggesting that in order to grasp the potential productivity of such a breakdown, scholars of 
the global economy should begin to make a place for ‘the practical past’ within both their 
visions of history and methods of historical research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial turmoil that erupted in 2008 prompted countless appeals to the past. Even 
when the problem in subprime markets was only beginning to become apparent, those on 
Wall Street were already gripped by a “violent thirst for historical knowledge”, leading them 
to seek out clues or lessons in capitalism’s long history of crises.1 And as the turmoil spread so 
too did this thirst, with policymakers, technocrats and journalists alike all finding recourse to 
previous episodes of financial disorder. The Great Depression in particular acquired a strange 
omnipresence, constantly appearing within debates over the on-going crisis.2 As this latter 
episode now enters into the storehouse of history, it is becoming clear that its attendant 
appeals to the past are themselves a kind of historical phenomenon. Simply put, the crisis of 
2008 brought with it a return of the past to the financial imaginary.  
This ‘return’ raises new and important questions about the place of the past within 
contemporary capitalism. If “the Great Depression analogy refuses to go away”, as the 
historians Michael Bordo and Harold James have recently observed, then what is its function 
and why has it occurred in this present?3 What is it that past events do when they circulate 
within another present, and why did the crisis of 2008 bring with it so many appeals to prior 
crises? Moreover, if a presence of the past is part of financial history, then what might a 
methodology attuned to this kind of anachronism entail? That is, how would one actually 
begin to go about locating the past within the workings of global finance? In order to grapple 
with these questions, this article departs from existing debates over the status of history within 
international studies. Such debates typically begin with the issue of historical truth and then 
use this to develop competing roadmaps for the conduct of inquiry.4 Yet to do this is to 
overlook what is at stake in a return of the past, for while representations of the past do have 
their own histories, the force of these in another present hinges on a later process that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gillian Tett, ‘Wall Street’s Crash Course’, The Financial Times, 26 August 2007. 
2 See Amin Samman, ‘The 1930s as Black Mirror: Visions of Historical Repetition in the Global Financial 
Press, 2007-2009’, Journal of Cultural Economy 5, no. 2 (2012): 213-29.  
3 Michael Bordo and Harold James, ‘The Great Depression Analogy’, Financial History Review 17, no. 2 (2010): 
127-40, 127. 
4 See John Gaddis, 'History, Science, and the Study of International Relations', in Explaining International 
Relations Since 1945, eds. N. Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 32-48; Colin Elman and Miriam 
Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2001); Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, eds., Historical Sociology of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'International Relations and the 
'Problem of History'', Millennium 34, no. 1 (2005): 115-36; and George Lawson, 'The Eternal Divide? History and 
International Relations', European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (2012): 203-26. 
	   3 
precedes all questions of historical truth. Coming to terms with this latter process requires a 
shift in focus from the truth of the past or the genealogies of history to what Eileen Joy calls 
the ‘entanglements’ of the present.5   
This argument is developed in three stages. The first of these focuses on how our 
psychic relation to the past is differentially charged through specific ways of writing history. It 
begins by outlining Michel de Certeau’s critique of historiography, going on to illustrate the 
kinds of relation to the past provided for by historical discourse. It then joins Hayden White 
in identifying ‘the practical past’ as a more fluid and pliable way of relating to the past that 
has been obscured by the entrance of history into science. The second stage then extends 
White’s account by locating the practical past within the contemporary operations of 
capitalist historiography. In order to do this it focuses on how the past has figured within the 
fields of financial economics, economic history, and constructivist political economy. It is 
argued that in the run-up to 2008, each of these fields were structured around an exclusion of 
the idea that the practical past can serve as an input into historical process. A more or less 
explicit dependence on the practical past is then located within their respective responses to 
the crisis of 2008, enabling the return of the past to be grasped as a reappearance of that 
which was previously repressed within capitalist historiography. Finally, the third stage goes 
beyond both White and de Certeau by asking what all this might mean for the future conduct 
of historical research. Here it is argued that the return of the past warrants and provides the 
grounds for an approach that would situate the practical past within both the crises of 
capitalist finance and the very process of financialised accumulation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Quoted in Jane Bennett and William Connolly, 'The Crumpled Hankerchief', in Time and History in Deleuze 
and Serres, ed. Bernd Herzogenrath (London: Continuum, 2012), 153-71, 166. 
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HISTORY, HISTORICAL WRITING, AND THE PRACTICAL PAST 
In the opening of Rainer Maria Rilke’s great modernist novel, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids 
Brigge, the eponymous protagonist passes a series of hospitals and is struck by the strangeness 
of death. Different deaths are there for the dying, he states, recalling that of his grandfather, 
but die we all will. In the face of this realisation Malte finds himself impelled to act: “I have 
done something against the fear. I have sat up all night and written”.6 Rilke too felt this 
impulsion, and in the novel that resulted, both he and his character find recourse to a range 
of childhood memories and historical sources, all of which figure as parts of his attempt to 
learn how to live in a new and uncertain age. In so doing, Rilke and Malte write a relation 
between past and present that is lacking in much of the debate over history in international 
studies.7 Specifically, they indicate a ‘now’ that cannot be divorced from the ‘then’, a 
recollection that cannot be reduced to the mere recovery of facts, and a discourse whose form 
must somehow mediate between the registers of fiction and history. By routing Rilke through 
de Certeau and White, this section finds in Malte’s notebooks a starting point for approaching 
the return of the past. 
Meaning and function in the writing of history 
For Michel de Certeau, much as Rilke’s Malte, our relation to the past is borne of an 
obsession with death. Quite simply, because everyone knows they are going to die, they are 
forced to remember how life goes on in order to continue living. But because the past is 
forever gone, our attempts to recall and represent it are charged with an undercurrent of 
impossibility that ceaselessly threatens to throw us into meaninglessness.8 Historical discourse 
must therefore be understood in terms of its function – namely, its ability to produce “a 
society capable of managing the space it provides for itself”.9 Meanwhile, historical writing is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Rainer Maria Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (London: Dalkey, 2008/1910), 11. 
7 Despite their theoretical diversity, these debates continue to overlook the question of how and why different 
pasts might be conjured within another present. This is even the case when critical attention turns to the status 
of so-called ‘benchmark dates’. See Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 'Rethinking Benchmark Dates in 
International Relations', European Journal of International Relations (OnlineFirst, 16 October 2012). 
8 Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 
2-5. 
9 Ibid., 6. 
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best characterised as an ‘operation’ that somehow negotiates a relation with its constitutive 
outside – i.e. the ungraspable Real of history – while at the same time appearing to do nothing 
of the sort.10 And finally, history itself can be read as the product of precisely this kind of 
interplay between a representation and its non-representational ‘underside’. De Certeau’s 
basic critique of historiography therefore consists in an attempt to reveal not just the 
production of histories by historians, but also the production of history by historiography. 
In methodological terms, this approach suggests a focus on three distinct but related 
dimensions of the historiographic operation. First, there are the institutional arrangements 
that enable historical writing to occur, as schematised in de Certeau’s “combinatoire” of place, 
labour and discourse.11 Second, there are the situated acts of selection and exclusion, which, 
by determining the accepted “postulates of analysis”, enable the production of one kind of 
historical work rather than another.12 And third, there are the ruptures – or encounters with 
the Real – which provide the discontinuities needed for forming chains of events through 
narrative.13  When taken together, these three dimensions enable ‘history’ to be understood in 
more precise terms as an institutionally-determinate and necessarily productive kind of 
recording process, wherein specific modes of historiography endeavour to shore up their 
functional value, and historicity figures as both subject and object in this process. 
As Ian Buchanan points out, the corollary of this insight is not only that a culture is 
best understood through its response to an epistemological crisis, but also that the very nature 
of this response will set the parameters for its subsequent struggle against the Real of history.14 
Within the context of the present article, this is significant in that it provides the starting point 
for a meta-history of historiography. Specifically, if we invert Buchanan’s formulation, then 
de Certeau’s wager becomes that each mode of historiography will possess an underside, and 
that the precise form of this ‘other’ will reflect an epistemological movement that was 
undertaken in response to an earlier crisis. Moreover, if we follow this logic through another 
step, then crises of epistemology provide an opening through which we might glimpse the 
mode of relation between a discourse and its own historicity. Finally, if we complete the loop, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., 45-9. 
11 Ibid., 57. 
12 Ibid., 68. 
13 Ibid., 3-4. 
14 Ian Buchanan, Michel de Certeau (London: Sage, 2000), 81-2. 
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then it is to the disavowals and displacements of these crises that we must turn in order to 
account for the changing appearance of historical discourse over time. 
Modes of historiography and their historicity 
One such crisis that de Certeau identifies is the undoing of God’s Word, which he sees as 
providing a place for the initial emergence of historical discourse.15 With the transition from 
an oral to a scriptural economy, de Certeau argues, the sacred text is no longer heard as voice, 
but is instead produced through the work of writing. Yet in their subsequent attempts to 
“redefine themselves without that voice”, modern societies become unmoored and are left to 
float in the “vast sea of a progressively disseminated language”.16 This new situation drives 
the subject to “set himself up as a producer of writing”, transforming the subject of writing 
into a master, and the mastery of language into a new power: “that of making history and 
fabricating languages”.17 The discipline of history therefore emerges at a time when the 
fiction of Truth is revealed, and this is precisely why it establishes the idea of ‘facticity’, which 
enables it to substitute for religion. However, in order to continue performing this function, 
modern historians must bury the story of how they came to do so in the first place. The art of 
fiction is in this way the repressed other of history; it is the underside against which “Western 
historiography struggles”.18  
Within modern historical study, this underside resurfaces via the panics over 
objectivity that emerge during the 1960s, and which evolve into what is widely construed as 
crisis of the discipline during the 1980s.19 De Certeau’s emphasis on the narrative dimension 
of historiography contributes to this sense of crisis, but for the present purposes what is more 
significant is how he interprets this ‘crisis’ as an abreaction to the discipline’s entry into 
science.20 Specifically, de Certeau contends that the panic over objectivity emerges within 
historical science due to its inaugural denial of the letters, which effectively amounted to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 131-53. 
16 Ibid., 137 and 138. 
17 Ibid., 138 and 139. 
18 Michel de Certeau, Heterologies, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 
200. 
19  Compare Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joan Scott, 'History in Crisis: The Others' Side of the 
Story', American Historical Review 94, no. 3 (1989): 680-92. 
20 de Certeau, Heterologies, 199-224. 
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formal disavowal of its earlier basis in fiction. This first move temporarily relegates fiction to 
the status of a “shameful and illegitimate” component in the writing of history, but it is 
eventually undone by a later and seemingly affiliated controversy over the centrality of 
narrative to historical writing.21 De Certeau therefore sees in the story of fiction a privileged 
means for understanding the evolution of modern historical discourse. 
In keeping with this basic premise, Hayden White has recently sought to use the 
emergence of literary modernism in order to better understand the history of 
historiography.22 From the perspective of literary history, modernist novels are typically 
presented as an attempt to escape from the constraints of genre in order to better explore the 
vicissitudes of life amidst intellectual and industrial change.23 Their emergence is therefore 
usually taken to signify a crisis of form and its possible content, rather than a full-blown crisis 
of epistemology. However, for White both the birth and the legacy of the novel should not 
merely be read through reference to the events of history or the history of literature. Instead, 
he argues, they bear a crucial relation to the professionalisation of historical study that so 
intrigues de Certeau. 
The historical past versus the practical past 
According to White, the entry of history into science – and in particular, the “exclusion of 
rhetoric from historiology” – sends ripples through literary fiction because it robs historical 
study of its ability to speak to the present.24 At the centre of his argument is a distinction that 
Michael Oakeshott makes between two different kinds of past and their related uses or 
functions.25 The first is the ‘the historical past’, which is a past authenticated through the 
truth-procedures of the historian. For Oakeshott this past is an end in itself, and its discovery 
is properly motivated by nothing more than a desire to provide as full and objective a portrait 
of the past as is possible. In contrast, the function of what Oakeshott calls ‘the practical past’ is 
to enable and inform the decisions of individuals as they confront the mystery of an ever-
changing present. This past consists in the loose or unexamined memory that people carry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 219. 
22 Hayden White, ‘The Practical Past’, Unpublished Manuscript (2010): 1-30. 
23 For example see Peter Childs, Modernism (London: Routledge, 2008), 37-98. 
24 White, ‘The Practical Past’, 9. See also Hayden White, The Content of the Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 58-82. 
25 Michael Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 1-48. 
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around with them. It includes elements of the historical past, but these are filtered through 
idiosyncratic mnemonic practices, yielding potentially divergent experiences of history. 
While Oakeshott originally draws this distinction in order to protect historical research 
from the degenerative effects of an instrumental attitude towards the past, for White it is this 
very attitude towards instrumentalism that is degenerative. Specifically, White suggests that a 
new quest to uncover the historical past, which promises to tell us of “what people in other 
times, places and circumstances have done”, effectively prevents historians from sustaining an 
earlier concern with the practical past, which might tell us “what we, in our situation, in our 
time and our place, should do”.26 Historical study in turn becomes unable to see the present as 
history, and the question of how to negotiate new social realities is pushed beyond the 
boundaries of the discipline. It is for this reason, White argues, that radical new literary forms 
emerge; they are attempts to question or supplement “the kind of knowledge about the past 
produced by the new cadres of professional historians”.27 Hence, with the exclusion of an 
explicitly practical function for the past within historical discourse, we also find the genesis of 
a displaced crisis in literature, wherein a new generation of novelists set out to explore how 
the past might once again serve “as a resource for social and cultural renewal” in the 
present.28 
At this point it is worth returning to the story of Rilke and Malte. Malte’s fear of death 
drove him to write, and it was an appeal to the past that furnished him with much of his 
subject matter. But while Malte is usually seen to have failed in his attempt to become an 
artist, Rilke is not, and this is because he imagined a rich and gripping nexus of memory, 
facticity, and historicity. In what follows, I argue that precisely such a nexus – which 
Oakeshott and White designate as ‘the practical past’ – has been revealed through the crisis of 
2008 as crucial to the appearance of global capitalism. This argument involves two distinct 
but related moves. The first of these uses de Certeau’s method to identify and analyse a signal 
failure in the operation of capitalist historiography. The second then goes beyond de Certeau 
by suggesting that this very failure reveals a new possible future for historiographic practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 White, ‘The Practical Past’, 11 (emphasis in original). 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
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THE EXCLUSION OF THE PRACTICAL PAST FROM THE OPERATION OF 
CAPITALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY 
In this section I begin the first of these moves by arguing that the operation of capitalist 
historiography has been structured around an exclusion of the practical past. In order to do 
this I focus on three different fields of social science that are central to contemporary 
understandings of financial crisis, and are thus directly implicated in the operation of 
capitalist historiography. By undertaking an analysis of the practices that characterise each of 
these fields, I develop a set of three inter-related theses regarding their implicit relation to the 
past. These theses then form the basis for a meta-historical reading of the return of the past in 
our next section. 
Thesis I: History is the repressed other of financial economics 
Neoclassical economics in general and modern finance theory in particular has 
sought to exclude historical time from its models. This has long been observed and 
criticised by heterodox scholars, who have sought instead to situate finance within 
history, but the linearity of chronological time continues to function as a limit to 
historical thought. 
Modern economics has been indelibly shaped by the rise of formalism. This shift reflects a 
broader transformation in political economy that is usually traced back to the ‘marginalist 
revolution’ of the late nineteenth century. As William Jaffé points out, there are important 
differences between the pioneering marginalists, but both W. S. Jevons and Léon Walras help 
to establish mathematics as a preferred language for economic analysis.29 In the wake of this 
change, modern physics becomes a model for economic science, and mechanical models of 
equilibrium – which entail a distinctly impoverished conception of historical time – become 
the basis for a neoclassical turn in economic theory.30 For example, in the influential model of 
‘general equilibrium’ put forward by Walras, all markets are born equal and equilibration is 
an immanent tendency set in motion by external change. Time is reduced to a path for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 William Jaffé, 'Menger, Jevons and Walras De-Homogenized', Economic Inquiry 14, no. 4 (1976): 511-24. See 
also Margaret Schabas, A World Ruled by Number: William Stanley Jevons and the Rise of Mathematical Economics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
30 Philip Mirowski, ‘Physics and the ‘Marginalist Revolution’’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 8, no. 4 (1984): 
361-79. 
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variables, and the change that prompts adjustment remains a mystery, as does the historical 
genesis of the market system itself.31 
Of course, the world of economic thought has never been as homogenous or closed as 
the one envisioned by general equilibrium theory, but following its introduction into the field 
formalism comes to acquire a kind of ecological dominance. In addition to recruiting a new 
generation of scholars to neoclassical theory, formalism influences the development of 
Marxian economics by luring it into an increasingly technical and ultimately unproductive 
debate over the accumulation process.32 It is also able to domesticate Keynesian ideas by 
shoehorning them into the models of the so-called “neoclassical synthesis”.33 But within the 
study of finance both of these heterodox traditions are almost entirely eclipsed by an uptake of 
the equilibrium framework, which treats finance as little more than a market for loanable 
funds. Jan Toporowski characterises the 1960s as a tipping-point in this process, arguing that 
finance theory has since been reduced to “the most abstract and other-worldly axioms of pre-
Keynesian microeconomics”.34 Duncan Wigan also observes an “expurgation” of Keynesian 
ideas during this time, but he instead emphasises how portfolio theory transforms uncertainty 
into an object of calculation.35 Insofar as this latter development has its roots in probability 
and general equilibrium theory, it reproduces the reduction of time to ‘inter-temporal choice’ 
that defines formal microeconomics more generally. But as Wigan points out, it also involves 
a dream of finance without history – in the form of a world with “fungible prices for all times, 
places and things” – which has been central to the rise of modern financial derivatives.36 
Somewhat ironically, then, the near-total annihilation of history within theory coincides with 
the emergence of an industry that trades almost exclusively in claims on the future. 
The fundamental consequence of this is that conventional financial economics has 
been unable to comprehend the historical dynamics of capitalist development and crisis. 
Heterodox scholars have long been aware of this shortcoming, but even their attempts to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Victoria Chick and Sheila Dow, ‘Formalism, Logic and Reality: A Keynesian Analysis’, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 25, no. 6 (2001): 705-21. 
32  For example see Geoffrey Harcourt, Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
33 Paul Samuelson, Economics (3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), 212. See William Darity and 
Warren Young, 'IS-LM: An Inquest', History of Political Economy 27, no. 1 (1995): 1-41. 
34 Jan Toporowski, The End of Finance (London: Routledge, 2000), 2. 
35 Duncan Wigan, ‘Financialisation and Derivatives: Constructing an Artifice of Indifference’, Competition and 
Change 13, no. 2 (2009): 157-72, 160-63. 
36 Ibid., 161. 
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situate finance within history have been hampered by a limited conception of historical time. 
In Post-Keynesian theory, for example, to be within history is simply to be carried forward by 
the flight of time’s arrow. This idea can be traced back to Joan Robinson’s critique of 
neoclassical economics during the 1960s and 1970s. Contrasting the smooth mechanics of 
equilibrium theory with the “turbulence of actual history”, Robinson argues that a model 
based on the former would sink the moment it was “set afloat in historical time”.37 Or to put 
it differently, its assumptions and axioms would always be immediately nullified by “an ever-
moving break between the irrevocable past and the unknown future”.38 The theoretical 
legacy of this critique has been twofold. Within mainstream economics there has been a 
renewed focus on context and process, as evidenced in the literatures on spatial 
agglomeration, scale effects and path dependency.39 Conversely, on the margins of the field 
there has been a revival of older traditions that were always suspicious of equilibrium doctrine, 
as evidenced in the emergence of Post-Keynesian Institutionalism.40  
These are quite distinct legacies, but both nevertheless reproduce the flaw inherent in 
Robinson’s conception of time and the past. By emphasising the difference between logical 
and historical time, Robinson reduces historical time to chronological time, thereby obscuring 
the subtlety of historical change and the role that the practical past might play in such a 
process. Michael Turk puts it well when he suggests that “the set nature of the past ... must be 
tempered by its retrospective reconstruction as history, [which is] affected in turn by ... the 
comprehension, consciousness, and memory of it”.41 Neither of the two approaches indicated 
above has achieved this. By conceiving of institutions as the “carriers of history”, the new 
historical economics cannot see beyond the literal bequest of the past to the present; and by 
focusing on the strictly forward-moving evolution of legal and financial structures, scholars 
working within Veblenian or Minskyan traditions stop short of asking whether historical time 
might loop back on itself. 42 Thus, even after Robinson’s critique, the idea of history in 
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economics remains ensnared by a sequential or linear logic. History, however, is fraught with 
strange loops. 
Thesis II: Fiction is the repressed other of economic history 
Philosophers and meta-historians have steadily undermined the idea of historical 
science by emphasising a necessary and productive relation between fiction and 
history. This insight has yet to find its way into the mainstream of economic and 
financial history, where it remains obscured by neoclassical theory and cliometric 
methods. 
The story of history and narrative goes back a long way, and it has already been 
reconstructed in numerous histories of historiography.43 For our purposes, the key point is 
that in the wake of new theories of language and discourse, various thinkers begin to ask what 
it might mean to use the same word – ‘history’ – to connote both a series of phenomena, and 
the narration of that series. Before long this line of questioning produces a pronounced shift in 
the debates surrounding history, which come to focus on the nexus of time, narrative and 
historical consciousness.44 The scope of this literature is now vast, but its origins can be traced 
back to the pioneering work of Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur. 
While White is perhaps most famous for underlining the function of narrativity within 
historical writing, he also places great emphasis on the necessarily fictional representation of 
reality implicit in all narrativised histories. In The Content of the Form, for example, he 
repeatedly argues that although past events, structures and processes may indeed have really 
existed in one present or another, a plot is something that can only be imposed upon them 
through retrospective acts of selection, sequencing, and configuration.45 Moreover, it is 
precisely such a narrative form that enables us to endow a series of factual statements about 
the past with a distinctly historical meaning and significance.46 For White, then, narrative 
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discourse has a trans-historical truth-producing function at the level of the social, and when 
belief in this power begins to wane, “the entire cultural edifice of a society enters into crisis”.47 
The apparent coherence of history therefore hinges on the ability of historians to tell plausible 
stories, and the past is a resource they are impelled to draw upon in this pursuit. 
Paul Ricoeur joins White in observing the structural unity of fictional and historical 
narrative. But rather than seeing narrative as a kind of meta-code that covers over the 
meaninglessness of history, Ricoeur instead finds a ‘healthy circle’ between time and narrative 
that is properly constitutive of history.48 In one respect, he argues, plot is something that 
allows us to experience time as something other than a series of unrelated instants – that is, in 
both sequencing and configuring these instants, it “provides a transition from within-time-
ness to historicality”.49 And yet by virtue of this very function, plot is also something that is 
always-already in a process of development, and within which we find ourselves enmeshed: 
“Historicity … comes to language only so far as we tell stories or tell history”, but at the same 
time, “We belong to history before telling stories or writing history”.50 What Ricoeur refers to 
as ‘emplotment’ is therefore not only a means for generating figurations of temporality, but 
also an act that refigures the time of the present within which human action occurs. The 
coherence of life itself therefore hinges on our ability to see the present through the lens of 
narrative time. 
What both White and Ricoeur effectively underline is the interpretive 
interdependence of events disjoined by chronological time. If narrative alone can invest 
history with meaning or time with history, then because narrativity entails the ‘grasping 
together’ of more than one event, all events contained within a narrative find their historical 
meaning in relation to one another. And because the arrow of chronological time continues 
to fly forward, new events can always destabilise old meanings by prompting a re-emplotment 
of the past. Both White and Ricoeur therefore speak directly to the debate on time in 
economic theory. Specifically, they suggest that there can never be a final word on the past 
because its mutability is precisely what enables Robinson’s ‘ever-moving break’ to be 
transformed into historical consciousness. Conversely, and in light of this, Robinson’s concern 
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with the destructive effect of time upon models should alert us to the function of narrative in 
the face of crisis.  
Unfortunately, even though each of these debates has been influential in their 
respective fields, neither has engaged the other, and their co-produced insight into the 
fundamentally practical function of past has yet to penetrate the discipline of economic 
history. As we have seen, the broad legacy of Robinson’s critique has been a new institutional 
turn in the study of economics, accompanied by a somewhat less visible return to the old 
institutionalisms of the early twentieth century. But if the latter remains the preserve of 
heterodox political economists, the success of the former has been achieved through its 
application of neoclassical tools to history. In methodological terms, this has prevented the 
renaissance in narrative history from reaching economics, which in turn has served to keep 
the relation between history and fiction from view.  
As de Certeau rightly points out, in the wake of the Great Depression, the writing of 
history becomes the writing of economic history. 51  But one consequence of the rising 
neoclassical tide during the 1930s is a sea change in the study of economic history itself. 
Taking shape in the 1960s under the leadership of figures such as Douglass North and Robert 
Fogel, the so-called ‘cliometrics revolution’ sees a new cohort of economists come to history 
armed with a combination of neoclassical price theory and statistical technique.52 For these 
scholars, history is an objective science and the promise of the past is to serve as “a giant 
experiment station for economic ideas”.53 Hence, at the same time as Robinson is arguing 
that a ‘new historical economics’ is needed in order to overcome the limits of neoclassical 
formalism, cliometricians are already in the process of developing one by bringing a 
hypertrophic version of that formalism into historical study. At least in the US, then, economic 
historians take flight from the narrative form just as other historians do the opposite. In terms 
of financial history, this development can be seen in the literature on the Great Depression, 
where the landmark study of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz helps to inaugurate a shift 
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from the tales of J.K. Galbraith and Charles Kindleberger to the tests of Ben Bernanke and 
Barry Eichengreen.54 
Of course, even cliometrics involves recourse to style, metaphor and story. But to 
focus strictly on the rhetoric of economic historians, as D. N. McCloskey and others might 
have it, would be to miss a broader transformation in the emplotment of capitalist history 
itself.55 Specifically, with the formalisation of theoretical and historical economics, plot is 
pushed out of economic historiography. This undermines the ability of individual histories to 
perform the narrative function, which in turn forces narrative practice onto a higher plane of 
abstraction. Moreover, in this space between histories, White and Ricoeur’s focus on the 
historical text encounters its limit. What, we might ask, are the practices that enable 
cliometric findings to form the basis for a properly narrative understanding, and precisely 
how do these practices interact with the living plots of history? 
Thesis III: Historicity is the repressed other of constructivist political economy 
In recent years, political economists have begun to acknowledge the fictive 
dimension of crisis by focusing on processes of social construal and construction. 
But in attending to meta-theoretical debates concerning the relation between ideas 
and materiality, they have ended up blind to the intersubjective constitution of 
historicity itself. 
Much like ‘history’, the very notion of ‘crisis’ contains a rich and productive ambiguity: It 
connotes a critical juncture that requires decisive action, but it also indicates how such action 
requires subjective intervention.56 In contemporary IPE, this has led scholars to consider 
crises as potentially transformative moments during which interpretive struggle conditions 
institutional evolution. Mark Blyth, for example, has consistently argued that agents need 
ideas in order to make sense of a crisis, and that this in turn situates ideological contestation at 
the base of any subsequent institutional change.57 Like-minded scholars have also begun to 
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focus more closely on the processes through which one interpretation of a crisis may come to 
prevail over another. Blyth himself has written on “inter-elite attempts at persuasion”, which 
he suggests are waged in the name of various “crisis-defining ideas”, while Leonard 
Seabrooke has argued that these inter-elite debates may be held to account by “everyday 
discourses constructed by mass public agents”.58 In this view, a crisis is not simply an event 
that agents perceive as necessitating institutional change; it is also one that serves to “ignite 
processes of persuasion” both within and across different institutional domains.59 
A broadly similar use of the term can be found in the work of Colin Hay, whose 
theory of crisis emerges alongside Blyth’s during the late 1990s. But with Hay the subjective 
indeterminacy of crisis becomes a basis for institutional change via concepts drawn from 
Marxist state theory. Specifically, Hay conceives of decisive subjective intervention as a 
contingent response to the objectively overdetermined failure of an economic regime.60 
Before a ‘crisis’ can be said to exist, he argues, the various contradictions that underpin 
systemic failure must be discursively recruited as “symptoms” and incorporated into a “meta-
narrative of crisis”.61  But once such a meta-narrative emerges, it opens up an uneven space 
of struggle between itself and other competing narratives, mapping-out a “discursively 
selective terrain” that privileges some constructions of crisis over others. 62  The very 
constitution of a crisis moment is therefore itself a moment of crisis, and initial meta-
narratives articulated in the media can be decisive in determining the nature of any 
subsequent institutional transformation. Crucially, though, this process need not yield major 
structural change, for just as contradictions can be recruited as symptoms of systemic failure, 
they can also be discursively negotiated in ways that save a model of development from 
wholesale delegitimation. 
In both of these approaches, crises give rise to a circumscribed but fundamentally 
underdetermined process of construal, which then shapes any subsequent pathway of 
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institutional change. Each also emphasises the centrality of narration to this process. Hay does 
this most explicitly through his notion of ‘meta-narration’, but others similarly anchor their 
key concepts in an appeal to the power of the narrative form. For example, Blyth suggests 
that “attempts at persuasion take the form of developing and deploying ‘causal stories’ about 
the economy”.63 The logical implication of this is that crisis-narratives and the crisis-defining 
ideas they support might very well involve the representation of past crises. And if the context 
of crisis – however conceived – conditions the selection and retention of these narratives and 
ideas, then the relevant features of that context are also likely to condition the selection and 
retention of recollected histories. The practical past is in this way already an immanent 
presence within constructivism. However, the new crisis theory has been held back from 
engaging with this point through the same kind of mechanism that keeps history from finance 
and fiction from history – namely, the disciplining function of its field-specific meta-discourse. 
When lined up against equilibrium finance theory and cliometrics, constructivism 
looks infinitely better placed to tackle the complexity of historical time, and it is. Yet this 
potential remains hampered by a carefully negotiated identity whose contours reflect the 
parameters of inherited meta-theoretical debate. Take Blyth and Widmaier’s ‘uncertainty-
based’ constructivism, which has risen to prominence in IPE by modeling its initial challenge 
on that of its older sibling in IR. In theoretical terms, this has involved justifying its right to 
exist through increasingly banal debates over old dualisms, such as those that pit agency 
against structure, interests against ideas, and ideas against materiality.64 These discussions 
were clearly part of an attempt to engage the dominant rationalist tradition by distinguishing 
constructivism from more radical postmodern approaches. But one consequence of this 
strategy has been an empirical bias towards topics that are more easily tractable in 
methodological terms. This has produced a cloud of relative silence around the 
reinterpretation of the past events, where two or more presents are in play. Indeed, so far the 
closest they have come to addressing this silence is an admission that “intensified debate over 
the meaning of contemporary events often fosters reinterpretations of past wars and crises”.65 
What remains to be asked is precisely how the interpretation of past crises might interact with 
attempts to establish the meaning and significance of a crisis in the present. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Blyth, ‘Powering, Puzzling, or Persuading?’ 762. 
64 For example, see Widmaier et al., ‘Exogenous Shocks?’ 750-53; Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig 
Parsons, eds., Constructing the International Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-19. 
65 Widmaier et al., ‘Exogenous Shocks?’ 755. 
	   18 
The story of Hay’s constructivism is somewhat different. Although his approach is 
initially informed by and aimed at a predominantly Marxist literature, its later development 
takes place through reference to a set of more general debates surrounding the theory and 
practice of political analysis. In many ways these debates are simply different versions of those 
that accompany constructivism in IPE. But within British political science the dichotomy of 
positivism and interpretivism occupies a unique position, serving to organise other more 
specific debates regarding the relation of structure to agency and interests to ideas.66 The 
popularity of Hay’s approach has therefore been premised on a promise to provide a pathway 
between and beyond this dichotomy.67 Yet by fixing attention on the context in which crisis 
narratives are deployed and taken-up, this framing device has served to marginalise how such 
narratives are developed through particular renderings of the past. The result is a concept of 
conjuncture that serves to eclipse any role for the past therein. Hence, even though it is 
implicit in their respective frameworks, both branches of constructivist crisis theory end up 
turning a blind eye to the imaginary institution of historicity. 
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THE CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED 
With this analysis in place, it is now possible to see both the crisis of 2008 and the return of 
the past in a new light. When grasped together with the modes of historiography that 
preceded the crisis, subsequent appeals to the past appear not simply as an expression of 
historical confusion or uncertainty, but also as a return of that which was previously repressed 
within the writing of capitalist history. Moreover, when viewed in properly socio-historical 
terms, this return of the repressed itself indicates a fundamental breakdown in the operation 
of historiography. In what follows I develop this argument by indicating a return of the past in 
each of the three fields discussed above.  
Finance/History 
In terms of academic economics, the past reappears in two distinct but related ways. The 
most obvious of these can be located in the auto-critique of mainstream scholars, who have 
begun to comment upon the blindness of economic theory in the run-up to the crisis. David 
Colander, for example, has seen fit to address the “systemic failure of the economics 
profession”, while Paul Krugman has even gone so far as to announce the onset of a “Dark 
Age” in macroeconomics.68 These critiques are even more common in heterodox circles, but 
by surfacing within the mainstream they reveal a broader recognition that the models used to 
understand contemporary finance are worlds apart from the phenomena they strive to 
apprehend. More importantly, though, these same critiques have given rise to an explicit 
reappraisal of the place of history and narrative in economics. For example, Michael Bordo 
and Harold James have responded to the crisis by observing that “in general, history rather 
than economic theory seems to offer a guide in interpreting wildly surprising and inherently 
unpredictable events”.69 Meanwhile, advocates of a new behavioural approach to economics 
have made their case through an appeal to the power of stories, which they assert are central 
to the formation of expectations, bubbles and crises.70 The recent crisis has therefore placed 
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history – along with its interpretation or representation – at the heart of debates about the 
future of economic theory.  
A related process of revelation can also be found in a turn toward the historical record 
within policymaking circles. As Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan have recently 
pointed out, financial regulation is a fundamentally pragmatic enterprise that rarely involves 
the neat “application of theory-based prescriptions”.71 With the onset of the 2008 crisis, 
however, the unprecedented response of policymaking organisations has relied on a 
thoroughly historical form of pragmatism, with financial, fiscal, and monetary authorities all 
grounding their deliberations in an appeal to the ‘lessons’ of the past. The Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933, for example, along with its repeal in 1999, has loomed large over contemporary 
discussions of regulatory reform. Meanwhile, questions concerning the deployment of public 
funds and their eventual recoupment have drawn from the experiences of Japan and Sweden 
during the 1990s; and those regarding the future of monetary policymaking have been littered 
with references to the mismanagement of prior asset-price bubbles. Insofar as these appeals to 
the past entail a bypassing of finance theory, they compound the critique of formal modelling 
offered by economists such as Colander, Krugman, Bordo and James. But by beginning with 
history rather than theory, they also suggest that policymakers too have been forced to take 
the idea of historical knowledge more seriously. 
History/Fiction 
In terms of economic and financial history, the signs have been subtler but no less telling. 
Quantitative study remains alive and well, but its promise to uncover the ‘truth of the past’ is 
buckling under the weight of the competing insights it is proving able to generate. This is 
especially the case when it comes to the Great Depression. Although that episode first 
emerges as the holy grail of financial cliometrics during the 1980s, the crisis of 2008 has seen 
a wealth of new studies seek to address the policy dilemmas of the present. Recent work in 
this vein has focused on topics as diverse as the relation between monetary policy and asset-
price bubbles, the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal stimulus, and possible exit strategies 
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from crisis-response measures.72 Of course, when understood as a reflection of the complexity 
of the Great Depression, this diversity is not a challenge to the field. If anything, it shores up 
the claim to objectivity that enabled quantitative history to flourish in the first place. But 
when viewed as an illustration of the sheer multiplicity of meaning that the past that can 
bestow upon the present, which it surely is too, then it hints at the kind of temporality that has 
been systematically repressed within the study of economic history.  
When situated alongside other developments in the writing of economic history, this 
point of tension becomes more pronounced. A quick scan of recent bestsellers reveals a return 
of the Great Depression to narrative history, with new revisionist accounts garnering media 
attention at the same time as reprinted old classics are celebrated for their newfound 
prescience. For example, while Kindleberger’s seminal The World in Depression featured 
extensively in the pages of the Financial Times during the peak of the crisis, Amity Shlaes’ The 
Forgotten Man received the support of Forbes Magazine in a high-profile dispute between its 
author and Paul Krugman over the legacy of the New Deal.73 By underlining the sheer 
polyvalence of the past, developments such as these indicate the increasingly fragile nature of 
historical certainty in economics. Quite simply, it is no longer clear what kind of crisis began 
to unfold in late 2007. And although Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s recent study 
may have temporarily succeeded in obscuring this development, its sarcastic title – This Time 
is Different – is starting to look as though it would be better read literally, because in the 
varying form and content of historical representation that the crisis has unleashed, it would 
appear to have opened up a new and different temporality.74 
Fiction/Crisis 
In terms of constructivist crisis theory, it is still to early tell what the impact of 2008 will be. 
But if practices of historical interpretation were the underside of constructivist scholarship in 
the run-up to 2008, then they have been brought closer to the surface in its wake. Specifically, 
where before the practical past figured as a largely unspoken corollary of existing frameworks, 
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it now figures as the subject of a performance that serves to both disclose and obscure the 
revealed shortcomings of the field. For example, take Colin Hay’s work on the crisis of 
Keynesianism in Britain. In his landmark 1996 article, Hay observed that the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ – as a hegemonic narrative of crisis  – was “seemingly appealed to, and conjured, 
in each wave of industrial unrest”, but he did not go on to develop this insight.75 In response 
to the recent crisis, though, Hay himself has looked back to the crisis of the 1970s, yet he has 
done so in a way that effectively obscures the power of ‘conjuring’ that he alluded to some 13 
years earlier. Specifically, Hay suggests that the ‘crisis’ of 2008 can be understood without 
reference to practices of historical interpretation, even though he anchors this very point in a 
counter-analogy with the crisis of the 1970s.76 Consequently, the practical past figures as a 
kind of absent presence; it serves as a device for the theorist, who uses it to interpret the 
present, but it is simultaneously withheld from the subjects of theory, who are only permitted 
to think events through stories about presently existing paradigms. Hay therefore performs a 
kind of double-move, recalling his forgotten revelation in order to shore up a theory that has 
been structured around its exclusion. 
A similar absent presence can be detected in the recent work of Wesley Widmaier, 
who has sought to re-evaluate the crises of the early 2000s. In the wake of the Asian crisis, 
Widmaier repeatedly emphasised how contending theoretical frameworks had shaped the 
norms and practices of international monetary cooperation, identifying successive periods of 
Keynesian, New Classical and New Keynesian consensus.77 In response to the subprime crisis, 
however, he has revised this story, recasting the previously stabilising influence of New 
Keynesianism as a form of “technocratic repression”, which he now suggests might actually 
have helped to generate the crises of late neoliberalism.78 Once again, the practical past can 
be detected in the labour of the scholar, and yet it remains conspicuously absent from the 
substance of their analysis. Unlike Hay, Widmaier does explicitly seek to effect a change in 
the body of constructivist theory, but the irony is that he ends up mirroring the kind of 
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political psychology he ascribes to policymakers, revealing the co-constitution of past and 
present through the very exclusion of such a phenomenon from his discourse. In these ways, 
both constructivist approaches to crisis have effectively disclosed the theoretical repression 
upon which they have been built. 
The reappearance of the practical past 
In summation, it is possible to discern a key change within the conduct of capitalist 
historiography. Before the crisis of 2008 there was a clear tendency to treat the past as a 
linear succession of presents, but in the midst and wake of that crisis, a rather different 
relation to the past has been brought to the fore. Within financial economics, a practical use 
for the past has been revealed not simply through the auto-critique of orthodox scholars, but 
also in the centrality of historical interpretation to the practice of crisis management. Within 
economic history, its profound mutability has been revealed through the profusion of different 
crisis narratives, and in the ever-shifting points of historical reference upon which these have 
relied. And within constructivist political economy, the broader meta-historical significance of 
these two developments has been revealed in the way that prominent scholars have been 
forced to draw upon and even reassess past events in their attempts to grasp the meaning of 
the crisis.  
When taken together, these developments signal a more or less implicit return of that 
which was previously repressed within modern historical science – namely, the idea that the 
past can and indeed must be brought into the present in order to recognise the present as history, 
and to manage the dilemmas that a particular present might be seen to pose. Such a return 
suggests that the crisis of 2008 should be interpreted not simply as a crisis of global finance, 
but also as a broader and related crisis of historical consciousness, borne of a fundamental 
breakdown in the operation of capitalist historiography. By structuring itself around an 
exclusion of the practical past, historical writing has become unable to perform its basic 
double-function, and in the return of the past that accompanied the recent crisis, we 
encounter a response to this failure that also is its primary symptom. Hence, the practical past 
reappears in this present not in spite but precisely because of its exclusion from the writing of 
capitalist history. 
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REMAKING GLOBAL FINANCIAL HISTORY 
When viewed in meta-historiographic terms, the return of the past invites a reappraisal of 
both prior and present modes of historiography. If we follow de Certeau’s logic, then such a 
return constitutes a fleeting appearance of the underside to capitalist historiography; and once 
read through specific machineries of historical writing, this enables us to apperceive the 
significance of an earlier response to epistemological crisis (namely, the entry of history into 
science). This reappearance is also significant in that it intimates the possibility of another 
epistemological movement whose precise form will condition future struggles between 
historical science and the real of history. Hence, by virtue of its sheer irruption, the return of 
the past potentially invests contemporary historical discourse with a new historicity. Yet 
within the return of the past we also find a range of discursive practices that would seem to be 
implicated in the making of global financial history, and which in turn both warrant and 
provide the grounds for a heretofore-missing mode of historiography. 
Empiricism and historicity 
The philosophical underpinnings of this new historiography require further attention, but 
they would clearly need to differ from those that have come to shape the debate over history 
in international studies. Here I wish to indicate one possible way forward, which would be to 
situate White’s ‘practical past’ within a Humean domain of the imagination, and to then 
explore the quasi-causal powers of this imagination via a form of critical historical 
empiricism.79 Such an approach would reject the idea – typical of narrow empiricism – that 
observation can reveal the ‘laws of history’, deeming this the height of theoretical hubris. It 
would also put to one side any search for the ‘truth of the past’, because no matter how 
nuanced such a search may be, they invariably end up overlooking the possibility of an 
equally significant reappearance of that past within a later present. It would even differentiate 
itself from a properly empiricist genealogy, whose attempts to unearth ‘the history of the 
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present’ also tend to bury the presence of the past.80 Instead, a critical empiricism would begin 
with the historicity of the present, focusing in particular on the circulation of past events 
within that present.  
More concretely, such an approach would take a specific or local milieu as its starting 
point, asking how the inhabitants of these milieus might come to experience an event as 
belonging to history.81 In order to do this it would follow practice, using representations of the 
past as an index for the production of this historical experience. The empirical task, in other 
words, would be to identify the practices of historical representation that bring the dates and 
events of history into the interpretive orbit of another present. And finally, the motivating 
question would need to be that of how an “unforeseeable selection” from among these various 
dates and events helps to drag history forward into different futures.82 When taken together, 
these signposts indicate a kind of historiography wherein the practical past and its attendant 
histories are recast as a potential input into historical process. This approach entails a shift in 
focus from what there is or was to what we are doing, but it also demands that capitalist history 
itself be approached as an idea that somehow pulls itself up by its own bootstraps. 
Futures for historical research 
Such a reorientation immediately indicates two avenues for historical research. The first of 
these concerns the function of the past within the crises of capitalist finance. Insofar as financial crises 
both recur and are continually attributed to something called ‘capitalism’, then the affiliations 
that are formed between these events through their various returns are implicated in the 
bootstrapping of capitalist history referred to above. One clear challenge for the kind of 
historiography being advocated here must therefore be to explore the ‘intra-temporality’ 
opened up by crisis, and to begin treating moments of crisis as something other than linearly 
related presents in time. In this author’s view, one way of doing this would be to bring the 
insights of meta-history into crisis theory.  
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As we have seen, the meta-historical literature on narrative focuses on the interpretive 
interdependence of events disjoined by chronological time, but it has failed to address the 
ongoing and socially-situated practices of historical interpretation through which this might 
play out in the present. Conversely, the constructivist literature on crisis does precisely the 
opposite: it focuses on the diverse and contested practices through which an unfolding event is 
ascribed historical meaning, but has yet to address the role of past crises in this process. The 
promise of bringing these two literatures together would be to situate crises within historical 
time, and to wrest the practice of historiography from the domain of the meta-historian, 
enabling everyday acts of historical interpretation and representation to become the subject of 
an interrogation into the imaginary institution of historicity. In methodological terms, this 
would require a focus not only on the actual practices of historical representation that are 
employed within specific milieus – such as, for example, those of public economists, financial 
journalists and (inter-) national policymakers – but also on exactly how these portrayals of 
past crises interact with one another and inform ongoing attempts to establish the meaning 
and significance of a crisis in the present. The task, in other words, would be to approach the 
past as a key resource for those confronting the dysfunction of global finance.  
The second key avenue for research concerns the function of the past within the very process 
of financialised accumulation. The logic behind such a focus is rooted in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
identification of diachrony as a primary axiomatic of capitalism.83 Insofar as capitalism entails 
a reversal in the relation between production and exchange, then money becomes a fulcrum 
for its allocative decisions; but because the money form is only able to dispense this function 
by mediating between the present and different prospective futures, the imagined or virtual 
past becomes an input into the very process of accumulation.84 Hence, another important 
challenge is to ascertain precisely how a co-existential and multi-layered temporality is able to 
serve as the material for contemporary processes of accumulation. Once again, two existing 
strands of research provide complementary insights for developing such an approach.  
The first of these can be found in heterodox political economy, where there is growing 
interest in new means of making claims on expectations about the future. Marxist 
contributors to this literature typically focus on the emergence of new financial instruments, 
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such as derivatives, whereas those working within a Veblenian tradition tend to focus instead 
on legal conventions and the broader operation of capitalisation.85 Yet despite this difference 
of emphasis, both see the future as having already begun to transform capitalism. Neither, 
however, pays adequate attention to how shared visions of the future are generated. 
Conversely, recent attempts to develop a thicker sociology of finance begin by exploring the 
various procedures through which futures are envisioned and quantified, but here broader 
structural questions are typically left unaddressed.86 The promise of bringing these two 
literatures together would be to operationalise Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion that each 
new sub-axiom of capital must be fed with a stream of events and dates – i.e. that the shifting 
technical procedures of financial market practice necessarily rely upon an associated set of 
more informal procedures for interpreting the past. In methodological terms, this would 
require a focus not only on distinct agents of capitalist finance – such as foreign-exchange 
traders, portfolio managers and macroeconomic analysts – but also on how these agents grasp 
together different times in ways that enable futures to become streams of earnings. To adopt 
such an approach would be to further develop the logic behind a focus on dysfunction by 
situating the practical past within the very functioning of global finance. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article began by observing how in the wake of the 2008 crisis, appeals to the historical 
record have flourished at the same time as their potential significance has been ignored. By 
drawing on the meta-historiography of Michel de Certeau, an important relation has now 
been uncovered between this development and the modes of historical writing that preceded 
it. Specifically, within financial economics, economic history, and constructivist political 
economy, we have identified a tendency to institute a temporal schism between past and 
present, which has effectively limited historical knowledge to a knowledge of the past as it 
really was. But to know the past in this way has been to overlook how the past must always be 
brought into the present in order for a society to recognise and manage itself as one. All three 
modes of writing have therefore rendered themselves unable to perform the basic function of 
historical discourse. An acknowledgement of this enables the appeals to history that 
accompanied the crisis to be apprehended as both a return of the repressed and a 
fundamental breakdown in the operation of capitalist historiography.  
But if what we have termed ‘the practical past’ has been revealed as crucial to the 
appearance and function of capitalist history, then this breakdown also warrants and provides 
the grounds for a new mode of historiography. Put simply, if historical action and 
interpretation are intertwined (and the past serves as a fundamental component of the latter), 
then recollected histories should be recast as a situated force of history-production. Such an 
approach would require a purposive departure from the debates over history within 
international studies, where theoretical and methodological discord has served to 
circumscribe the question of historicity by obscuring the potentially productive power of 
anachronism. Here I have indicated one possible way forward, which would be to remake the 
historiography of global capitalism by locating the practical past within both the crises of 
capitalist finance and the process of financialised accumulation. Although this may seem a 
daunting task, it is clearly one that needs taking up, for to do so would be nothing more than 
to afford the subjects of theory the same basic capacity for historical thinking that theorists of 
history themselves seek to exercise. 
